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WINFIELD v. COMMONWEALTH: THE APPLICATION OF THE
VIRGINIA RAPE SHIELD STATUTE
I. INTRODUCTION
In Winfield v. Commonwealth,' the Virginia Supreme Court held that
the state's recently enacted rape shield statute could not restrict or in-
fringe upon the defendant's sixth amendment right2 under the United
States Constitution to confront his accusers.3 In overruling the trial judge,
the court stated that section 18.2-67.7 of the Code of Virginia4 actually
1. 225 Va. 211, 301 S.E.2d 15 (1983).
2. The sixth amendment contains the following pertinent language: "In all criminal prose-
cutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to be confronted with the witnesses against
him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assis-
tance of counsel for his defense." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
3. 225 Va. at 218, 301 S.E.2d at 19.
4. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.7 (Repl. Vol. 1982). The Virginia law provides:
A. In prosecutions under this article, general reputation or opinion evidence of the
complaining witness's unchaste character or prior sexual conduct shall not be admit-
ted. Unless the complaining witness voluntarily agrees otherwise, evidence of specific
instances of his or her prior sexual conduct shall be admitted only if it is relevant and
is:
1. Evidence offered to provide an alternative explanation for physical evidence of
the offense charged which is introduced by the prosecution, limited to evidence
designed to explain the presence of semen, pregnancy, disease, or physical injury to
the complaining witness's intimate parts; or
2. Evidence of sexual conduct between the complaining witness and the accused
offered to support a contention that the alleged offense was not accomplished by
force, threat or intimidation or through the use of the complaining witness's mental
incapacity or physical helplessness, provided that the sexual conduct occurred
within a period of time reasonably proximate to the offense charged under the cir-
cumstances of this case; or
3. Evidence offered to rebut evidence of the complaining witness's prior sexual con-
duct introduced by the prosecution.
B. Nothing contained in this section shall prohibit the accused from presenting
evidence relevant to show that the complaining witness had a motive to fabricate the
charge against the accused. If such evidence relates to the past sexual conduct of the
complaining witness with a person other than the accused, it shall not be admitted
and may not be referred to at any preliminary hearing or trial unless the party offer-
ing same files a written notice generally describing the evidence prior to the introduc-
tion of any evidence, or the opening statement of either counsel, whichever first oc-
curs, at the preliminary hearing or trial at which the admission of the evidence may
be sought.
C. Evidence described in subsections A and B of this section shall not be admitted
and may not be referred to at any preliminary hearing or trial until the court first
determines the admissibility of that evidence at an evidentiary hearing to be held
before the evidence is introduced at such preliminary hearing or trial. The court shall
exclude from the evidentiary hearing all persons except the accused, the complaining
witness, other necessary witnesses, and required court personnel. If the court deter-
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expanded the admissibility of evidence related to specific prior sexual
conduct of the prosecutrix.6 By this ruling, Virginia has joined a minority
of jurisdictions which have refused to recognize the special dilemma of
the prosecutrix in a rape trial and to grant additional protections under
her constitutional right of privacy.6 Such recognition and protection is the
intent of the rape shield statutes.7
This comment will examine Winfield and analyze the defendant's right
of confrontation in relation to the victim's right of privacy and the state's
interest in prosecuting the violent crime of rape. Section 18.2-67.7 will be
interpreted in light of the Winfield decision, and future standards of ad-
missibility for reputation and specific conduct evidence will be explored.
Finally, in view of the creation of a Court of Appeals of Virginia, sched-
mines that the evidence meets the requirements of subsections A and B of this sec-
tion, it shall be admissible before the judge or jury trying the case in the ordinary
course of the preliminary hearing or trial. If the court initially determines that the
evidence is inadmissible, but new information is discovered during the course of the
preliminary hearing or trial which may make such evidence admissible, the court
shall determine in an evidentiary hearing whether such evidence is admissible.
Id.
5. 225 Va. at 220, 301 S.E.2d at 20.
6. In addition to Virginia, the states of Michigan, Oregon, and New Hampshire have ad-
hered to the view that rape shield laws must not infringe upon the defendant's constitu-
tional right of confrontation. Also, to a lesser extent, Pennsylvania and Tennessee have up-
held the defendant's right to cross-examine the victim fully. See infra note 82.
7. Forty-seven states and the federal government have passed some type of rape victim
protection law: ALA. CODE § 12-21-203 (Supp. 1983); ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.045 (1980); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 41-1810.1 (1977); CAL. Evm. CODE § 782 (West Supp. 1983); COLO. REv. STAT. §
18-3-407 (Repl. Vol. 1978); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-86f (West Supp. 1983-84); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 3508-3509 (Repl. Vol. 1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.022(2) (West Supp.
1983); GA. CODE ANN. § 38-202.1 (1981); HAWAII R. Evm. 412 (1981); IDAHO CODE § 18-6105
(1979); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 115-7 (Supp. 1983-84); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-4 (Burns
Supp. 1983); IOWA CODE ANN. § 813.2 rule 20(5) (West 1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-447(a)
(1976); Ky. RFv. STAT. ANN. § 510.145 (Baldwin Supp. 1983); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15.498
(West 1981); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 461A (Repl. Vol. 1982); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 233, §
216 (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983); MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 750.520j (West Supp. 1983-
84); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.347(3) (West Supp. 1983); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-70 (Supp.
1983); Mo. REv. STAT. § 491.015 (Supp. 1984); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-15-401 to -403
(1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-323 (1979); NEv. RFv. STAT. §§ 48.069, 48.071 (1981); N.H. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 632-A:6 (Cum. Supp. 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-32.1 (West Supp. 1983-
84); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-16 to -17 (1978 & Supp. 1983); N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 60.42
(McKinney 1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-58.6 (Repl. Vol. 1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-14
(Repl. Vol. 1976); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2907.02, 2907.05 (Baldwin 1982); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 22, § 750 (West Supp. 1983-84); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.475 (1979); OR. R. Evm. 412
(1983); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3104 (Purdon 1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-13 (1981);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-659.1 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983); S.D. Comp'. LAWS ANN. § 23A-22-15
(1979); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-17-119 (Repl. Vol. 1982); Tsx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.13
(Vernon Supp. 1982-83); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3255 (Supp. 1983); WASH. REv. CODE ANN.
§ 9.79.150 (1977); W. VA. CODE § 61-8B-12 (1977); WIS. STAT. § 972.11 (Supp. 1983-84);
Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-312 (1977). Also, the United States federal courts provide rape shield pro-
tection. FED. R. EVID. 412.
434 [Vol. 18:433
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uled to go into effect on January 1, 1985,8 this comment will examine how
future appeals of the trial judge's evidentiary order might be handled and
whether it is necessary for the General Assembly to modify the rape
shield statute.
11. THE VRGINiA RAPE SHIELD STATUTE-SECTION 18.2-67.7
The sexual revolution of the late 1960's brought with it a more open
forum in which to discuss intimate sexual issues.9 Partly because of this
situation, legal commentators have questioned the common law rules for
admitting evidence in rape trials.10 It is generally agreed that evidence of
the victim's prior sexual conduct has little probative value."1 Defense at-
torneys historically have humiliated and embarrassed rape victims, not to
enlighten the jury, but to redirect the focus of the trial from the defen-
dant toward the prosecutrix. 2 Thus, only a minority of victims report
rape to the police.13 Consequently, during the 1970's, legislatures began
enacting statutory protections for the victim in the form of rape shield
laws.1 4 Usually the statutes were broad prohibitions with specific excep-
tions for admission of prior sexual conduct of the prosecutrix. Such an
approach was considered necessary because the prior vague evidentiary
concepts of relevancy and probative value had lent themselves to easy
manipulation.15
8. VA. CODE ANN. § 17-116.01 (Cum. Supp. 1983).
9. See A. SmITH & J. Gmis, AN AMERICAN RAPE (1975); RAPE VCMnOLOGY (L. Schultz ed.
1975).
10. There have been many articles written on rape and rape shield statutes. Those most
often cited by the Virginia Bar include the following: Amburg & Rechtin, Rape Evidence
Reform in Missouri: A Remedy for the Adverse Impact of Evidentiary Rules on Rape Vic-
tims, 22 ST. Lous U.L.J. 367 (1978); Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape
Cases in the Courtroom, 77 COLuM. L. REv. 1 (1977); Gold & Wyatt, The Rape System: Old
Rules and New Times, 27 CATH. U.L. Rzv. 695 (1978); Kneedler, Sexual Assault Law Re-
form in Virginia-A Legislative History, 68 VA. L. Ray. 459 (1982); Ordover, Admissibility
of Patterns of Similar Sexual Conduct: The Unlamented Death of Character for Chastity,
63 CORNELL L. REv. 90 (1977); Spector & Foster, Rule 412 and the Doe Case: The Fourth
Circuit Turns Back the Clock, 35 OKLA. L. REv. 87 (1982); Tanford & Bocchino, Rape Vic-
tim Shield Laws and the Sixth Amendment, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 544 (1980); Comment, The
Illinois Rape Shield Statute: Will It Withstand Constitutional Attack, 1981 U. ILL. L.F.
211.
11. See Kneedler, supra note 10, at 486.
12. See Comment, Federal Rule of Evidence 412: Was the Change an Improvement?, 49
U. CrN. L. Rv. 244, 247 (1980) ("Unfortunately, misuse of the victim's sexual past has been
the rule rather than the exception in rape trials, because a victim who possesses an illicit
sexual background is apt to be perceived as somehow undeserving of the protection of crimi-
nal rape laws.").
13. See infra note 15.
14. See supra note 7.
15. There are many examples of gross abuses in questioning a victim about her general
reputation for chastity in the community. This line of questioning is allowed under the the-
ory that a person of bad moral character is less likely to speak the truth. See, e.g., Brown v.
1984] 435
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Prior to Virginia's enactment of a rape shield statute, trial courts in the
Commonwealth followed the traditional common law standards which al-
lowed the defendant to prove consent by introducing character evidence
of the complainant's reputation in the community for being unchaste and
immoral.'6 However, such reputation evidence was excluded when used
only to attack the credibility of the witness or to impeach her testi-
mony.17 Generally, Virginia did not admit evidence of specific prior sexual
conduct of the prosecutrix to prove her general propensity to be sexually
active.' s Such evidence was deemed too prejudicial. However, there were
four exceptions. The defendant himself could testify to prior sexual acts
with the prosecutrix in order to show the likelihood of consent. 9 To rebut
certain physical evidence such as pregnancy, disease, or the presence of
semen, the defense could expose the complainant's other sexual relations
as a possible source for such evidence.20 Evidence of prior sexual relations
between the victim and a third party was admissible if the defendant
State, 50 Ala. App. 471, -, 280 So. 2d 177, 179 (1973) ("The rule [of competent evidence]
is based on the theory that a person of bad moral character is less likely to speak the truth
as a witness than one of good moral character. .. ."). Specifically in relation to rape, hav-
ing a chaste character is pertinent to the possibility of consent. People v. Collins, 25 IMI. 2d
605, -, 186 N.E.2d 30, 33 (1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 942 (1963) ("The underlying
thought here is that it is more probable that an unchaste woman would assent. than a
virtuous woman. .. ").
Clearly this potential attack on the victim's character helped rape become the least re-
ported crime. Even though there were 55,000 to 60,000 reported attempted or actual rapes
in 1974, it was feared that three or four times more assaults were actually committed, but
the victims were afraid to report them to the police. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES 11 (1974) [hereinafter cited as UNIFORm
CRIME REPORTS]. See Berger, supra note 10, at 4-5, 15-17; Hall, The Role of the Victim in
the Prosecution and Disposition of a Criminal Case, 28 VAND. L. REV. 931, 935-36 (1975);
see also NATIONAL ADvISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GoALs, A NA-
TIONAL STRATEGY TO REDUCE CRIME 21 (1973) [hereinafter cited as NATIONAL STRATEGY].
16. See Wynne v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 355, 218 S.E.2d 445 (1975).
Virginia has long followed the generally accepted rule that where consent is ad-
vanced as a defense to a charge of rape, the previous unchaste character of the prose-
cutrix may be shown by proof of general reputation .... Such evidence is relevant
and admissible, within the recognized limits, to show the probability of consent by
the prosecutrix.
Id. at 356, 218 S.E.2d at 446. See also Burnley v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 356, 158 S.E.2d
108 (1967); Fry v. Commonwealth, 163 Va. 1085, 177 S.E. 860 (1935).
17. See Fry, 163 Va. 1085, 177 S.E. 860. The court upheld the trial judge in prohibiting
the defense from using chastity to impeach the prosecutrix, saying, "It is not competent in a
simple attack on credibility." Id. at 1088, 177 S.E. at 862.
18. Wynne v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 355, 356-57, 218 S.E.2d 445, 446 (1975).
19. Finney v. Commonwealth, 154 Va. 808, 152 S.E. 555 (1930) (defense allowed to ques-
tion the prosecutrix about sexual intercourse with the defendant to show probability of
consent).
20. Dotson v. Commonwealth, 170 Va. 630, 196 S.E. 623 (1938) (prosecutrix less than 16
years old and pregnant; the defense allowed to elicit testimony on cross-examination that
the prosecutrix had had sexual relations with others and this sexual activity accounted for
her pregnancy).
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could demonstrate that the complainant had an ulterior motive to charge
the accused with rape.2 1 Finally, if the prosecution offered evidence of the
victim's chastity, the defense could rebut this claim by proving specific
sexual relations involving the victim.22
In response to the previously mentioned deficiencies in the common
law view, 23 the Virginia General Assembly enacted a rape shield statute in
1981.24 The statute is divided into three parts: prohibitions, admissions,
and procedural qualifications. The Code of Virginia rejects the common
law and explicitly bars the introduction of "general reputation or opinion
evidence of the complaining witness's unchaste character or prior sexual
conduct."25 Reputation and opinion testimony concerning the victim's un-
chaste character cannot be introduced even to prove consent.26
The statute proceeds to outline the four instances in which specific
prior sexual conduct of the victim is admissible. These exceptions to the
general prohibition, all directly related to the exceptions found at com-
mon law,27 allow evidence (1) to prove consent by prior sexual acts with
the defendant; (2) to explain the existence of pregnancy; (3) to provide a
motive to fabricate a charge of rape; and (4) to rebut the prosecution's
own testimony.28 It was originally believed that the "motive to fabricate"
exception would be narrow in scope and would apply only to the type of
situation the court had previously recognized. 9 In such a situation, the
prior sexual behavior would be the direct cause of the prosecutrix's
fabricating the rape charge. An example of the motive to fabricate is the
case in which the complainant is afraid to admit having been sexually
active, believes she is pregnant, and charges an innocent third party with
rape.30
21. Dotson v. Commonwealth, 170 Va. 630, 196 S.E. 623 (1938) (defendant allowed to
introduce evidence that the prosecutrix was impregnated by one of two others and that she
was impelled by an ulterior motive to bring a rape charge against the defendant).
22. Gray v. Commonwealth, 184 Va. 236, 35 S.E.2d 65 (1945).
23. See supra notes 9-15 and accompanying text.
24. 1981 Va. Acts ch. 397 (codified at VA. CoDE ANN. § 18.2-67.7 (RepL Vol. 1982)). See
supra note 4.
25. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.7(A) (Repl. Vol. 1982).
26. Kneedler's article discusses which provisions required compromise and what objec-
tions were raised about the statute. See Kneedler, supra note 10, at 460-61, 492, 494, 496
n.144.
27. Compare cases cited supra notes 19-22 with VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.7 (RepL Vol.
1982).
28. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.7(A)-(B).
29. See Kneedler, supra note 10, at 494-96. The bill, as originally proposed to the General
Assembly, did not contain the "motive to fabricate" section. This language was added as
part of a compromise to offset the prohibition of reputation evidence. Id.
30. See infra notes 97-105 and accompanying text. Without expressly limiting the de-
fense, the Code suggests using evidence only of past sexual conduct, saying courts should
admit "evidence relevant to show that the complaining witness had a motive to fabricate the
charge against the accused." VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.7(B) (RepL Vol. 1982).
19841
438 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18:433
Finally, the statute provides procedural safeguards to protect the vic-
tim. All evidence about the victim's sexual conduct must first be heard by
the judge in an in camera hearing before it can be used at a preliminary
hearing or at trial.31 The court's decision in the evidentiary hearing is
final unless new evidence is discovered before or during the trial, in which
case the judge may convene another in camera hearing and rule again. 2
III. Winfield v. Commonwealth
A. Statement of the Case
Herbert Winfield, Jr. was indicted for the rape and forcible sodomy of
Sandra Nelson." Admitting to sexual intercourse with the complainant,
the defendant alleged that the couple had entered into a prostitution
agreement and that the criminal charge was Nelson's retaliation for not
being immediately paid.3 4 Nelson contended that she had not willingly
participated in sexual intercourse but, rather, was threatened by Winfield
31. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.7(C) (Repl. Vol. 1982). Only the accused, the complaining
witness, necessary testifying witnesses, and court personnel are admitted to the evidentiary
hearing. Id.
32. The defense must give written notice of its intent to introduce any excludable evi-
dence and provide the prosecution an opportunity to argue against admitting such evidence.
Id.
33. Winfield v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 211, 214, 301 S.E.2d 15, 17 (1983).
34. Brief for Appellant at app. 34-48, Winfield v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 211, 301 S.E.2d
15. Winfield was questioned as to how the prostitution arrangement was made.
Winfield: She said... [another] guy wanted to give her $150.00 for the evening,
she asked me what I think she ought to do. I told her it was up to her.
Defense Attorney: Did you'll [sic] have any more conversation after that?
Winfield: Yea, that's when we started, I told her I say I'd give her $50.00.
Defense Attorney: Give her $50.00 for what?
Winfield: For ... [sexual intercourse].
Defense Attorney: And what did she respond?
Winfield: She said O.K.
Brief for Appellant at 34-35.
Winfield's testimony was partially corroborated by three defense witnesses. Winfield, 225
Va. at 217, 301 S.E.2d at 18. One of the witnesses claimed to have overheard Winfield and
Nelson making the prostitution agreement. Id. A cousin of Nelson testified that Nelson had
admitted to having sexual relations with Winfield in exchange for $50. "She said Bennie
[the defendant] had . .. [sexual intercourse with] her and she wished he had given her
$50.00 .... That she's going to make sure he gets some time." Brief for Appellant at app.
31. Finally a friend of both Nelson and Winfield saw the pair sitting close together and
apparently wanting to be alone. Winfield, 225 Va. at 217, 301 S.E.2d at 18.
All this testimony was admitted by the trial judge without an initial ruling on its admissi-
bility in an evidentiary hearing. It appears that the Commonwealth's attorney could have
objected to the testimony of these witnesses under § 18.2-67.7(C). Moreover, portions of this
testimony might have been stricken for failing to meet any of the exceptions under § 18.2-
67.7(A) or (B). Since the parties did not raise an objection, the issue is moot for the pur-
poses of this article. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.7 (Rep. Vol. 1982).
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and resisted to the best of her ability."3
As required by the Code of Virginia section 18.2-67.7, the defendant
requested a motion in limine on the admissibility of testimony of six wit-
nesses who would support Winfield's contention that Nelson's rape charge
stemmed from an ulterior purpose. At the in camera hearing, the defense
proffered the testimony of Leon Moore,
that Sandra Nelson agreed to have sexual intercourse with him on the con-
dition he pay her twenty dollars; that he had sexual intercourse with Sandra
Nelson; that he did not pay her the twenty dollars; that Sandra Nelson
stated that if he did not pay her the twenty dollars that she would tell his
wife; that he paid her twenty dollars .... 3
The remaining witnesses were to testify to the complainant's reputation
in the community for unchastity and immorality. Two witnesses were to
testify either to having sex with Nelson or to having previously paid her
for sexual favors. Others would testify that Nelson had told them of her
prior sexual activity or had admitted to prostituting herself.3 7
In a pretrial order, the trial judge prohibited the defense from intro-
ducing any of the proffered testimony. At trial Winfield testified that he
35. Winfield, 225 Va. at 216, 301 S.E.2d at 18. Nelson had gone to Winfield's apartment
on the night of the incident and asked for a ride to a local "night spot." Nelson alleged that
Winfield asked for sexual favors while giving her the ride, but that she rebuffed him. Win-
field then turned off the main highway to a rural area and told Nelson that she could not
leave the car because this was an area where the "K.K.K." met. Brief for Appellant at app.
20. According to Nelson, Winfield then stopped the car and threatened to hurt her if she
resisted. He forcibly removed her clothes and, pinning her hands behind her back, subjected
her to rape and sodomy. Id. at app. 21.
36. Winfield, 225 Va. at 214, 301 S.E.2d at 17.
37. The defense requested the in camera hearing to admit the following testimony.
(1) Testimony of Laurance Winfield that Nelson asked him if she should prostitute
herself because she needed the money; that he had sexual intercourse with her and
paid her ten dollars for the sexual favor; that Nelson has a bad reputation in the
community for being unchaste and immoral;
(2) Testimony of Anthony Branch that Nelson had on several occasions had sexual
intercourse with men and then reported the incident to the person's wife or girlfriend;
that Nelson has a reputation in the community for being unchaste and immoral;
(3) Testimony of Denise Daniels that Nelson told her that she had been offered
$100 by a man for sexual favors but instead she allowed him to feel her breasts for
$25; that Nelson has a bad reputation in the community;
(4) Testimony of Towana Parham that Nelson had stated to her that she had had
sex with several men and was not sure who impregnated her; that Nelson had a bad
reputation in the community, and
(5) Testimony of Carol Jackson that he had had sexual intercourse with Nelson;
that he knew a person who had paid $150 to have sex with Nelson; that he knew
another who had sex with Nelson [,] then Nelson told the man's girlfriend; that Nel-
son had a reputation in the community for being unchaste and immoral.
Id. at 214-15, 301 S.E.2d at 17.
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had entered into a prostitution contract with Nelson." The defendant's
story was partially corroborated by three witnesses, one of whom claimed
to have overheard Nelson and Winfield discussing the agreement.39 An-
other witness testified that Nelson had admitted to the prostitution
agreement and had said that she was "going to make sure he gets some
time" for not paying.40 The third testified that he had observed the two
together, apparently desiring to be alone.41 The jury found Winfield
guilty of both rape and forced sodomy.42
B. The Virginia Supreme Court Decision
In reversing and remanding the case,43 the Virginia Supreme Court
considered only the evidentiary issue." In setting the parameters of sec-
tion 18.2-67.7, the court said that no statute can deprive a criminal defen-
dant of his sixth amendment right to confront and cross-examine his ac-
cusers.'4 The court implied that the defendant's rights were paramount
and, as such, had to be strictly and completely enforced. Notably, there
was no discussion of the state's interest in prosecuting the crime or of the
victim's right of privacy, through which the court could have engaged in a
balancing of competing interests.4 Without acknowledging the intent of
section 18.2-67.7, the court said the statute actually expanded the use of
testimony of specific prior sexual conduct of the victim. "[T]he new law
gives a defendant access for the first time to far more probative evidence:
specific prior sexual conduct with third persons, if it is relevant for the
purposes set forth in Code § 18.2-67.7."'
The supreme court agreed with the defense's position that the evidence
which showed Nelson "had a distinctive pattern of past sexual conduct,
involving the extortion of money by threat after acts of prostitution, of
which her alleged conduct in this case was but an example, . . . [was]
38. Id. at 216, 301 S.E.2d at 18.
39. Id. at 217, 301 S.E.2d at 18. See supra note 34.
40. 225 Va. at 217, 301 S.E.2d at 18. See supra note 34.
41. 225 Va. at 217, 301 S.E.2d at 18-19. See supra note 34.
42. The defendant was sentenced by the jury to five years in prison for rape and five
years in prison for forcible sodomy. 225 Va. at 217, 301 S.E.2d at 19.
43. Id. at 221, 301 S.E.2d at 21. On remand to the circuit court, the judge granted permis-
sion for Leon Moore to testify. At the subsequent trial, the jury found Winfield guilty of
consent sodomy and fined him $500. Telephone interview with H. Taylor Williams, IV, at-
torney for defendant.
44. 225 Va. at 213, 301 S.E.2d at 16.
45. Id. at 218, 301 S.E.2d at 19. The court stated that "no legislation, however salutary its
purpose, can be so construed as to deprive a criminal defendant of his Sixth Amendment
right to confront and cross-examine his accuser and to call witnesses in his defense." Id.
(citing Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974)).
46. See infra text accompanying notes 58-92.
47. 225 Va. at 220, 301 S.E.2d at 20.
440 [Vol. 18:433
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relevant, probative and admissible in . . . [Winfield's] defense."48 This
circumstance triggered application of the "motive to fabricate" exception
of Code section 18.2-67.7(B). The court read into the statute a broad
privilege to enable the defense to introduce any evidence of specific prior
sexual conduct tending to support the contention that the victim's
charges served ulterior purposes. Even though Winfield had already been
permitted to corroborate his own testimony concerning the prosecutrix's
alleged scheme to extort money, the court reasoned that evidence of a
previous extortious scheme was admissible, specifically Leon Moore's tes-
timony about his meretricious relationship with Nelson.'9 "Thus there is
a sufficient nexus between ... [Nelson's] alleged efforts to extort money
by threats from others, after acts of prostitution, and Winfield's version
of her conduct in the present case, to render such evidence relevant and
probative of a motive to fabricate." 50 The court stated that if, at an evi-
dentiary hearing conducted pursuant to section 18.2-67.7(C), this evi-
dence tends to show a "pattern of past sexual conduct involving the ex-
tortion of money by threat after acts of prostitution" '1 and in addition
meets the rules of evidence, then the testimony should be admitted at the
trial.5 2
The court did, however, distinguish Moore's testimony from that of
other defense witnesses whose testimony was no more than an attack on
the complainant's character.5 3 The testimony of the latter witnesses was
offered to show Nelson's reputation as a prostitute through evidence of
specific prior sexual acts and general reputation or opinion evidence of
her unchaste character." Evidence of prior sexual acts does not establish
a motive to fabricate and was inadmissible both at common law and
under the rape shield statute.5 5 The reputation or opinion evidence is
inadmissible hearsay;56 but the court suggested that if, at a subsequent
48. Id.
49. Id. at 220, 301 S.E.2d at 21.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 220, 301 S.E.2d at 20.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 220-21, 301 S.E.2d at 21. See supra note 37.
54. 225 Va. at 220-21, 301 S.E.2d at 21.
55. Id. The court stated that
the proffered evidence of most of the witnesses to the effect that Sandra had engaged
in sexual acts with others for money, is a mere attack on her character, related only
indirectly to the theory of the defense. It attempts to show her reputation, by specific
acts, as a prostitute, but it does not directly establish a motive to fabricate any charge
against the accused. Such evidence was inadmissible at common law and the new
statutory scheme does not open the door to its admission.
Id.
56. Id. at 221, 301 S.E.2d at 21. The court stated that
any evidence of prior sexual conduct by the complaining witness must comply with
the usual rules of evidence as well as the requirements of the "rape shield" law. Since
general reputation or opinion evidence as to unchaste character is to be excluded, it
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evidentiary hearing, the trial court finds that such evidence meets an ex-
ception to the hearsay rule, then it would also be admissible.5"
IV. CONFLICTING CONSTITUTIONAL INTERESTS IN RAPE TRIALS
A. The United States Supreme Court Decision in Davis v. Alaska
The Virginia court's strict adherence to sixth amendment rights was
based on its interpretation of Davis v. Alaska.58 In Davis, the United
States Supreme Court held that a state statute barring reference to a ju-
venile record was unconstitutional when it denied the defendant the right
to confront his accusers and expose potential biases and prejudices.6 9 The
state's key witness in a burglary and larceny trial was a juvenile who had
previously been found guilty of burglary.60 The defense wanted to expose
this prior conviction, not to attack the juvenile's character, but to show
that the witness had acted out of fear and had made a hasty identifica-
tion in order to shift suspicion away from himself."1 Even though the trial
judge allowed the defense to develop partially the issue of bias during
cross-examination of the juvenile, the Court stated that the "[p]etitioner
was .. . [nevertheless] denied the right of effective cross-examination
which 'would be constitutional error of the first magnitude and no
amount of showing of want of prejudice would cure it.' ",62
It is questionable whether the Virginia Supreme Court correctly inter-
preted Davis. The United States Supreme Court in Davis defined the
right of confrontation as paramount.68 However, the decision was reached
appears probable from the defendant's notice that at least three of the proffered wit-
nesses would relate nothing more than inadmissible hearsay.
Id.
57. Id.
58. 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
59. Id. at 318.
60. Id. at 308. The prosecution's witness testified to seeing the defendants standing be-
side a car later discovered to contain paint chips from a safe which had been stolen. Id. at
310. The safe was found near the place where the witness said he saw the car parked. The
witness further testified to the fact that one of the defendants was holding "something like a
crowbar." Id.
61. Id. at 311. The juvenile was on probation for burglary at the time he observed the
defendants.
62. Id. at 318, (quoting Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129, 131 (1968) (quoting Brookhart v.
Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 3 (1966))). The trial court had granted a protective order to restrict the
defense from questioning the juvenile about his burglary charge. Davis, 415 U.S. at 311.
This motion was based on ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.080(g) (1979) (stating that "[t]he commit-
ment and placement of a child and evidence given in the court are not admissible as evi-
dence against the minor in a subsequent case or proceedings in any other court .... ") and
ALASKA R. CHELDREN'S P. 23. Davis, 415 U.S. at 311 n.2.
63. Davis, 415 U.S. at 319. "In this setting we conclude that the right of confrontation is
paramount to the State's policy of protecting a juvenile offender." Id. The Court viewed the
state's interest as inordinately burdensome to the defendant. "[T]he State cannot, consis-
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only after the Court had balanced all of the significant interests of both
the defendant and the state. After evaluating the totality of the circum-
stances, the Court found the state's interest in protecting the secrecy of
juvenile proceedings was "outweighed by petitioner's right to probe into
the influence of possible bias . . . ."" The Court's analytical process is
clearly presented in an opinion divided into three main parts in which the
Court discusses the key factors on each side and then compares their sig-
nificance.65 The Virginia Supreme Court correctly interpreted the portion
of the Davis opinion concerning the relevant weight of the sixth amend-
ment, but the Virginia court did not follow the entire decision because it
failed to evaluate and balance the competing interests of the state and
the defendant.
B. Conflicting Interests
The weight attached to the sixth amendment in the Davis decision con-
forms to that in other Supreme Court decisions."6 In Smith v. Illinois,6 7
having acknowledged that the right of confrontation is fundamental to
the criminal legal system,6s the Court held that testimony given under a
pseudonym by a key prosecution witness was in violation of this right.69
In Smith, the state wanted its informant to testify anonymously to pre-
vent him from being identified.70 The state's interest in Smith was clearly
equal to or greater than the state's interest under rape shield statutes,
which protect the victim from the temporary humiliation and adverse
psychological effects of publicly testifying about her sexual activity. The
Supreme Court in Smith, however, did not balance the competing inter-
ests but instead relied primarily on the fact that the defense was severely
handicapped in cross-examining the witness.71 It is difficult to see how
Smith fits into the Davis rationale. The apparent conflict can perhaps be
tent with the right of confrontation, require the petitioner to bear the full burden of vindi-
cating the State's interest in the secrecy of juvenile criminal records." Id. at 320.
64. Id. at 319.
65. Id. at 315-21.
66. See Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129 (1968); McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967);
Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957); see also Note, Extent of the Government's
Informer Privilege in Federal and Florida Criminal Cases, 21 U. FLA. L. REv. 218, 219
(1968).
67. 390 U.S. 129 (1968).
68. Id. at 129.
69. Id. at 133.
70. Id. at 130-31. The informant, while acting as an undercover agent, purchased drugs
from the defendant. The informant's testimony was critical to the prosecution's case.
71. Id. at 131. The defense was unable to interview this witness prior to trial. The inform-
ants credibility as a witness, if unknown to the defense, was clearly beyond the scope of
cross-examination. The Court said, "To forbid this most rudimentary inquiry at the thresh-
old is effectively to emasculate the right of cross-examination itself." Id. See also Tanford &
Bocchino, supra note 10, at 559-68.
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explained by the fact that Smith is an older case, decided before the
Court recognized the victim's right to protection of privacy.7 Smith also
preceded the Supreme Court's recognition of the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment as a universal protector of individual rights,
requiring the Court to balance conflicting interests. 3
The Supreme Court has given credence to the victim's interest by hold-
ing that the right of privacy is fundamental and cannot be breached ex-
cept for compelling reasons.74 Furthermore, the fourteenth amendment's
due process clause embodies the concept of personal liberty, including
sexual privacy.7 5 The Court "has recognized that a right of personal pri-
vacy or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under
the Constitution. ' 76 Furthermore, the interest of the state in preventing
crime must be added to the victim's right of privacy. Rape is an unre-
ported crime primarily because the victims are too intimidated and
frightened to seek help." During the early 1970's, rape was the fastest
growing violent crime in the country, yet the conviction rate remained
low.78 Law enforcement officials claimed that, in order to combat rape,
the victim had to be accorded special treatment.79
C. Resolution of Conflicting Interests
In order to resolve the confficting constitutional interests, it is neces-
sary to decide which is the most compelling-the rape victim's right of
privacy, the state's interest in prosecuting this violent crime or the defen-
dant's sixth amendment right of confrontation. A majority of the courts
72. See infra note 74 and accompanying text.
73. The fourteenth amendment provides:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immuni-
ties of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. See also Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979); Palmer
v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971); Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73
(1968).
74. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965);
see also Berger, supra note 10, at 47.
75. Roe, 410 U.S. at 129, 152. See generally Comment, The Illinois Rape Shield Statute:
Privacy at Any Cost?, 15 J. MAI. L. Rav. 157, 171 (1982).
76. 410 U.S. at 152. "These decisions make it clear that only personal rights that can be
deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' are included in this
guarantee of personal privacy .... " Id. (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325
(1937)).
77. See UNwORM CRIME REPORTS, supra note 15, at 22; see also State v. Fortney, 301 N.C.
31, - , 269 S.E.2d 110, 116 (1980); Comment, Criminal Law - The Constitutionality Of
North Carolina's Rape-Shield Law-State v. Fortney, 17 WAxE FOREST L. REv. 781, 797-99
(1981).
78. UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, supra note 15, at 23-24.
79. Compare id. at 11 with NATIONAL STRATEGY, supra note 15, at 10.
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which have reviewed rape shield laws have upheld the statutes as consti-
tutional and not offensive either to due process"0 or to the right to con-
front or cross-examine witnesses.81 In upholding the rape shield statutes,
these courts have uniformly applied a balancing test to examine the total-
ity of the circumstances.
Although it is a minority view, the Virginia Supreme Court's strict ad-
herence to the sixth amendment right of confrontation has been sup-
ported in other jurisdictions.8 2 The Oregon Court of Appeals in State v.
Jalos8 held that, despite the prohibition of the state's rape shield stat-
utes,8" a rape defendant could introduce testimony of other sexual con-
duct by the prosecutrix in order to prove a motive to fabricate."5 In Jalo,
the complainant was a ten-year-old who had been sexually active with the
defendant's thirteen-year-old son and others. The defense maintained
that, when the defendant discovered this situation, he told the complain-
ant that he would have to tell her parents.86 Apparently frightened, the
girl immediately accused the defendant of rape. At trial the defendant
was barred from using or referring to any evidence concerning the girl's
prior sexual conduct.8 7 This limitation effectively prevented raising the
"motive to fabricate" defense.88 The Oregon court relied on Davis, saying
80. Kemp v. State, 270 Ark. 835, 606 S.W.2d 573 (1980); Cherry v. State, - Ind.
414 N.E.2d 301, cert. denied, 453 U.S. 946 (1981); State v. Williams, 224 Kan. 468, 580 P.2d
1341 (1978); see also Annot., 1 A.L.R. 4th 287 (1980).
81. State v. Hill, 309 Minn. 206, 244 N.W.2d 728 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1065
(1977); State v. Fortney, 301 N.C. 31, 269 S.E.2d 110 (1980); State v. Persinger, 286 S.E.2d
261 (W.Va. 1982).
82. See People v. Williams, 95 Mich. App. 1, 289 N.W.2d 863 (1980); State v. LaClair, 121
N.H. 743, 433 A.2d 1326 (1981); State v. Jalo, 27 Or. App. 545, 557 P.2d 1359 (1976); Com-
monwealth v. Duncan, 279 Pa. Super. 395, 421 A.2d 257 (1980); Schockley v. State, 585
S.W.2d 645 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978); see also State v. Howard, 121 N.H. 53, 426 A.2d 457
(1981) (allowing the admission of evidence of the prosecutrix's prior sexual activity in a
statutory rape case).
83. 27 Or. App. 845, 557 P.2d 1359 (1976).
84. The Oregon rape shield statutes provides in part- "[I]n a prosecution . . . [of sex
offenses], evidence of previous sexual conduct of complainant shall not be admitted and
reference to that conduct shall not be made in the presence of the jury." OR. Rnv. STAT. §
163.475 (1979).
85. 27 Or. App. at , 557 P.2d at 1362.
86. Id. at , 557 P.2d at 1361. When confronted by the defendant, the complainant
admitted to having sexual intercourse with the defendant's son, another boy, and the com-
plainant's uncle. Id.
87. Id.
88. The initial trial ended in a mistrial because the defense, in the opening statement,
said that the prosecutrix "told the defendant that she had had sexual intercourse with a
. . y... and also he found out that his own son, his thirteen-year-old son was having
sexual intercourse with her." Id. at _ 557 P.2d at 1360 (quoting the defense attorney).
The trial court said the reference to the complainant's sexual conduct was prohibited by
statute. Id. The Oregon Court of Appeals said there was no error in the defendant's opening
statement and therefore no basis for a mistrial. The court further found that the second
trial was barred by double jeopardy and reversed the defendant's conviction at that trial. Id.
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"[tlhe only difference between Davis and this case is that the policy of
... [the rape shield statutes] is to protect a sex-crime complainant. On
the facts at bar, however, this policy must likewise be subordinated to the
defendant's constitutional right to confrontation."8 9
The Virginia court in Winfield recognized and adopted the Jalo reason-
ing.90 However, unlike the situation in Winfield, the defendant in Jalo
was denied the opportunity to present his entire defense. The trial judge
in Jalo not only denied the defendant the right of confrontation but also
breached the defendant's due process right to a fair trial.91 It was appro-
priate for the court of appeals in Jalo not to balance the competing inter-
ests in such a flagrant example of unfair proceedings. Winfield can be
distinguished because the trial court allowed the defense to show that the
victim may have had a motive to fabricate. 92 The Virginia Supreme Court
was faced with competing interests that should have been balanced.
V. SECTION 18.2-67.7 AFTmR Winfield
Even though the intent of Virginia's rape shield statute may have been
better served if the Virginia Supreme Court had employed a balancing
test, section 18.2-67.7(A) of the statute has effectively eliminated the use
of unchaste character evidence to prove the victim's bad reputation in the
community. The statute reverses a long line of cases that allowed reputa-
tion evidence to be admitted to suggest the victim's consent.93 Inevitably,
such reputation evidence opened the door for abuse by the defense attor-
ney in order to focus the jury's attention on the prosecutrix's character.
The court in Winfield gave two reasons for unholding section 18.2-67.7(A)
on reputation evidence, stating such evidence had little probative value
and "that there is no logical connection between a woman's willingness to
submit to the defendant accused of raping her, and her willingness to
share intimacies with another man with whom she might have had a spe-
cial relationship." 95
Of the four instances in which specific prior sexual conduct between the
at -, 557 P.2d at 1362.
89. Id. at -, 557 P.2d at 1362.
90. Winfield, 225 Va. at 219, 301 S.E.2d at 20.
91. Jalo, 27 Or. App. at , 557 P.2d at 1360-62.
92. Winfield, 225 Va. at 220, 301 S.E.2d at 20-21.
93. See, e.g., Wynne v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 355, 218 S.E.2d 445 (1975); Burnley v.
Commonwealth, 208 Va. 356, 158 S.E.2d 108 (1967); Powell v. Commonwealth, 179 Va. 703,
20 S.E.2d 536 (1942); Bailey v. Commonwealth, 82 Va. 107 (1886).
94. Such a reaction can be found in Bailey, where the court said, "This offense may be
committed as well on a woman unchaste, or a common prostitute, as on any other female. In
[the] matter of evidence, however, want of chastity may, within recognized limits, be
shown as rendering it more probable that she consented." Bailey v. Commonwealth, 82 Va.
at 110-11, quoted in Winfield, 225 Va. at 217-18, 301 S.E.2d at 19.
95. Winfield, 225 Va. at 218, 301 S.E.2d at 19.
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complainant and third parties can be introduced,9 s the court in Winfield
analyzed the only section subject to diverse interpretations. By expanding
the "motive to fabricate" exception to admit any evidence showing a sim-
ilar pattern of behavior by the prosecutrix in fabricating threats in con-
nection with her sexual activity, the court made the statutory exception
broader than was originally anticipated.9 7 Commentators had suggested
that only when a specific sexual act or relationship gave rise to a motive
to fabricate could the provision be utilized."'
This narrow interpretation of the motive to fabricate offered by the
commentators was originally defined in State v. DeLawder s under a
challenge of the Maryland rape shield law.100 The prosecutrix in De-
Lawder was a minor who had confided in the defendant her fear of preg-
nancy because of her relationship with a third person. 101 The defense
strategy was to show that the girl was so afraid of parental disciplinary
actions if she confessed that she fabricated the rape charge to excuse her
pregnancy.10 2 Under Maryland law the defendant was barred from asking
the prosecutrix if she had engaged in sexual intercourse with others to
account for her concern about being pregnant.103 Moreover, the defense
was prohibited from questioning the prosecutrix or her friend as to her
confessions about sex with others.'" The prosecutrix was not asked about
her fear of her mother because the testimony was considered irrelevant.105
The Maryland Court of Appeals said the defense was completely de-
nied the opportunity to prove why the prosecutrix was biased or had an
ulterior motive.106 Again, such an argument is not applicable to Winfield
96. See supra notes 19-22 & 27 and accompanying text.
97. Winfield, 225 Va. at 222, 301 S.E.2d at 21.
98. See Kneedler, supra note 10, at 494-97. See generally Sweet v. United States, 449
A.2d 315 (D.C. 1982); Commonwealth v. Frey, 390 Mass. 245, 452 N.E.2d 226 (1983).
99. 28 Md. App. 212, 344 A.2d 446 (1975).
100. The Maryland rape shield statute provides, in part-
Evidence of specific instances of the victim's prior sexual conduct may be admitted
only if the judge finds the evidence is relevant and is material to a fact in issue in the
case and that its inflammatory or prejudicial nature does not outweigh its probative
value, and if the evidence is:... (3) [e]vidence which supports a claim that the vic-
tim has an ulterior motive in accusing the defendant of the crime ....
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 461A (RepL Vol. 1982). See also FED. R. Evrn. 412; MnNN. STAT.
ANN. § 609.347(3) (West Supp. 1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-58.6 (Repl. Vol. 1981).
101. DeLawder, 28 Md. App. at , 344 A.2d at 451-54.
102. According to defense counsel, the prosecutrix's mother was a strict disciplinarian,
never allowing her to date and beating her as punishment for other misbehavior. Id. at ___,
344 A.2d at 453.
103. The court had said in an earlier appeal that this line of questioning was prohibited
by the rape shield statute. See DeLawder V. Warden, Md. House of Correction, 23 Md. App.
435, , 328 A.2d 76, 77 (1974).
104. DeLawder, 28 Md. App. at , 344 A.2d at 452.
105. Id. at -, 344 A.2d at 453-54.
106. Id. at ., 344 A.2d at 454.
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because the Winfield jurors were fully informed of the defense's theory of
prostitution.107 The court in DeLawder determined that the jury must
have been confused or misinformed because "the prosecutrix had indi-
cated only that she was afraid she was pregnant as a result of the alleged
rape."'18 Furthermore, since the DeLawder court relied on the Davis deci-
sion, it presumably balanced the competing interests. 0 9 After considering
the misconceptions of the jury and the defense's inability to argue its
case, the court held the defendant's evidence and cross-examination were
permissible.
The accuracy and truthfulness of the prosecutrix's testimony, perhaps
even more so than was the case with the witness in Davis, were key ele-
ments in the state's case against DeLawder. In fact, its case depended
entirely on the witness's veracity. The claim of bias, prejudice, or ulterior
motive which the defense sought to develop was admissible as a basis for
the inference of undue pressure because of the prosecutrix's possible fear
of her mother. The defense was otherwise unable to build a record from
which to argue to the jury why the prosecutrix might be biased or lack
that degree of impartiality expected of a witness at trial."0
In DeLawder it was the specific prior sexual activity that caused the
complainant to fear becoming pregnant and therefore to fabricate the
rape charge. As the dissent explains, in Winfield, the only common points
between the defendant's testimony and that of the other proffered wit-
ness were that the prosecutrix was involved in prostitution, and that both
the defendant and the proffered witness were unwilling to pay.," How-
ever, the Winfield jury heard testimony about the prostitution agreement
between Winfield and Nelson and about why the prosecutrix may have
wanted to retaliate against the defendant." 2 Winfield has broadened the
"motive to fabricate" provision to encompass any possible argument
when consensual intercourse is a defense. This expansion of the exception
is too great: "A threat to extort money is not the legal equivalent of a
motive to fabricate .... "113
VI. PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF SECTION 18.2-67.7
After the supreme court ruling, Winfield was remanded for a second
jury trial. The appeal itself had taken more than seventeen months; by
the time the second trial was completed, it had been almost two years
107. Winfield, 225 Va. at 216, 301 S.E.2d at 18.
108. 28 Md. App. at - , 344 A.2d at 453 n.7.
109. Id. at -, 344 A.2d at 449-50, 454.
110. Id. at , 344 A.2d at 454.
111. Winfield, 225 Va. at 223, 301 S.E.2d at 22 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 216-17, 301 S.E.2d at 18.
113. Id. at 223, 301 S.E.2d at 22 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
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since the incident had occurred,11 a lapse which raises questions about
the defendant's sixth amendment right to a speedy trial.115 Clearly an im-
mediate appeal from the trial judge's order barring the testimony of the
six proffered witnesses would have promoted judicial efficiency and saved
the Commonwealth significant time and expense. At the time of Winfield,
however, an appeal of the evidentiary order was not realistic since it
could have been heard only by an already overworked supreme court.
However, as of January 1, 1985, the new Court of Appeals of Virginia
will have appellate jurisdiction."16 Along with other appellate jurisdiction,
the court will hear appeals from final convictions in criminal trials as a
matter of right.1 However the court of appeals will not have jurisdiction
for equity suits except domestic relations suits1 8 and therefore could not
rule on an injunction per se.1 9 It seems appropriate that the Virginia
General Assembly should review the rape shield statute in light of the
new appellate court's jurisdiction in order to determine if it would be
more accommodating to grant appeals from the evidentiary hearing and
temporarily suspend the criminal trial. Such a system, which is already
utilized in other jurisdictions, 20 would serve three purposes: (1) to pro-
tect the privacy of the victims; (2) to prevent the judicial inefficiency of
having to remand and retry a case on the evidentiary order; and (3) to
speed up the trial process and preserve the defense's evidence. Naturally,
any appeal on the evidentiary hearing order would be objectionable if it
created burdensome delays.12'
Furthermore, the prosecutrix might be able to initiate an equitable ac-
tion for an injunction, claiming that section 18.2-67.7 implicitly provides
for a private remedy. This type of action was successful in Doe v. United
States,'22 in which the prosecutrix obtained a permanent injunction after
the trial judge ruled that all sexually related testimony would be admissi-
114. Compare the date of the Order of Punishment, Brief for Appellant at app. 8, Win-
field v. Commonwealth, No. 81-2250 (Supreme Ct. of Va., filed Nov. 12, 1982), with the date
of the opinion, Winfield, 225 Va. at 211, 301 S.E.2d at 15 (1983).
115. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and pub-
lic trial. .. ").
116. VA. CODE ANN. § 17-116.01 (Cum. Supp. 1983).
117. Id. § 17-116.05(A) ("Any aggrieved party may appeal to the Court of Appeals from
the entry by a circuit court of any final judgment,. .. [in] . .. [a]ny final conviction of a
crime except where a sentence of death has been imposed.").
118. Id. § 17-116.05(A)(3).
119. Id. § 17-116.05(A).
120. See Doe v. United States, 666 F.2d 43 (4th Cir. 1981); ARK. STAT. ANN. §41-1810.2
(1977); MD. R. P. 1085 (RepL VoL 1977); Mo. REV. STAT. 491.015 (Supp. 1984); N.C. Gm.
STAT. § 15A-979(C) (Repl. Vol. 1983); OR. R. EviD. 412(c) (1983); TENN. R. App. P. 9 (Supp.
1983); W. VA. CODE § 58-4-1 (1966); W. VA. R. Sup. CT. App. 6 (1984).
121. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
122. 666 F.2d 43 (4th Cir. 1981).
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ble. 12 The Fourth Circuit relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Cort
v. Ash, 12 4 which found that a criminal statute could provide a private
cause of action. 25 Drawing on the Cort rationale, the Doe court outlined
three pertinent factors that should be considered in determining if an im-
plicit cause of action exists: (1) whether the plaintiff (prosecutrix) is in
the special class expected to benefit from the statute; (2) whether there is
any indication of legislative intent to create or deny a private right; and
(3) whether it is consistent with the underlying purpose of the statute to
grant a remedy.'2  The issue of an implied private cause of action has
never been addressed by the Virginia Supreme Court. If the Virginia
courts do not find a private cause of action under the Cort doctrine, the
intent of section 18.2-67.7 would be frustrated, and the victim would not
have the opportunity to appeal an erroneous ruling.127 As mentioned
above, the court of appeals currently would lack jurisdiction to hear an
appeal from denial of an injunction.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Virginia Supreme Court in Winfield v. Commonwealth defined the
"motive to fabricate" provision of section 18.2-67.7 so broadly that any
nexus between a prosecutrix's alleged efforts to blackmail sexual partners
and the defense's proffered rationale of an ulterior purpose in a rape
123. The trial judge's evidentiary order would have allowed the defense to introduce evi-
dence that the prosecutrix allowed men to spend the night in her apartment and that she
had a reputation at a nearby army post for immorality. Doe herself was involved in a child-
custody proceeding which questioned her fitness as a mother and therefore wanted an in-
junction to prevent the court from calling the necessary witnesses and to seal the record. Id.
at 47-48. The trial judge denied the injunction order. It was this decision from which Doe
appealed. Id. at 45.
The case was tried in federal court because the rape had allegedly occurred on the Fort
Lee, Virginia military post.
124. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). See generally Comment, Private Causes of Action from Federal
Statutes: A Strict Standard for Implication By Sole Reliance on Legislative Intent, 14 U.
RICH. L. REV. 605 (1980).
125. 422 U.S. at 78-80. Cort involved a shareholder's action against the Bethlehem Steel
Corporation and its board of directors, who were allegedly making illegal campaign contri-
butions. The plaintiff sought an injunction to prevent corporate monies from being used in
this manner. Political contributions by corporations are criminal violations. Id. at 68-79.
126. Id. at 78, quoted in Doe, 666 F.2d at 46 n.6. The Doe court held that FED. R. Evm.
412 implicitly provides for a private remedy and, separately, for the right of appeal from the
criminal trial decision because no other party to the criminal trial shares the victim's inter-
est. "The rule makes no reference to the right of a victim to appeal an adverse ruling. Nev-
ertheless, this remedy is implicit as a necessary corollary of the rule's explicit protection of
the privacy interest Congress sought to safeguard." Doe, 666 F.2d at 46. The court then said
it had jurisdiction even though it was not reviewing the final judgment. Id.
127. A related issue is whether the victim is entitled to free counsel if she cannot afford
representation herself. Such legal services are provided in some states, such as Ohio. See,
e.g., OHio Rsv. CODE ANN. § 2907.02 (Baldwin 1982). A discussion of this issue is beyond the
scope of this comment.
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charge is admissible. By not setting limits on the "motive to fabricate"
exception, Winfield may provide the defense the opportunity to introduce
both legitimate and illegitimate evidence about the victim's specific prior
sexual conduct, thereby thwarting the original intent of the rape shield
statute. Otherwise, Winfield does acknowledge the legitimacy of section
18.2-67.7. Specifically, the use of general reputation evidence of a prose-
cutrix's bad moral character is no longer admissible in rape trials. More-
over, the introduction of evidence concerning the complainant's past sex-
ual conduct is limited to four specified instances.
Regrettably, the Virginia procedural practices whereby a rape victim
can obtain judicial review of a trial judge's evidentiary ruling are unset-
tled. Therefore, it is submitted that the Virginia General Assembly
should amend the state's rape shield statute in light of the formation of
the Court of Appeals of Virginia and should explicitly acknowledge the
victim's right to review of a trial court's evidentiary decision. Until these
changes occur, Virginia rape victims may point to the reasoning in Doe v.
United States128 in arguing that some method of judicial review is im-
plicit. Otherwise, the protection afforded to the rape victim by section
18.2-67.7 is in jeopardy.
Philip L. Hatchett
128. 666 F.2d 43 (4th Cir. 1981).
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